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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the use of 
terrorism by Syria, Libya and Iran in light of the changes 
in the structure of the international arena. Factors such 
as the U.S. raid on Libya, the end of the Cold War, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli peace 
conferences have altered the costs and risks associated with 
sponsoring terrorism. New economic, political and military 
costs have diminished the expected returns of the leaders of 
Syria, Libya and Iran in pursuing their goals through state 
sponsored terrorism.
It is suggested that state sponsored terrorism by these 
states will decline as the costs and risks involved in 
sponsorship increase and as the political power of the state 
decreases. The power and size of the individual state will 
determine the extent that these factors influence the 
continuation of state sponsored terrorism. Weaker states 
will be more susceptible to the increased risks associated 
with state sponsorship of terrorism.
The results reveal varying degrees of commitment to 
state sponsored terrorism by Syria, Libya and Iran, in 
relation to their political power. Syrian and Libyan 
terrorism have declined as the costs of such sponsorship 
have increased. The political power of Iran permits this 
state to ignore these costs and continue to sponsor 
terrorism. The hypothesis that the political power of a 
state helps determine its willingness to sponsor terrorism 
fits the cases of Syria, Libya and Iran.
vi
TERRORISM: IS IT ON THE DECLINE?
INTRODUCTION
State sponsored terrorism has been defined by several 
scholars, such as Cline and Alexander, in a vein similar to 
Clausewitz's definition of war, as a continuation of policy by 
other means.1 States such as Syria, Libya and Iran have used 
state sponsored terrorism as a continuation of both domestic 
and foreign policies. State sponsored terrorism permits 
states to pursue policy that is beneficial to the interests of 
the state. The sponsorship of terrorism by Syria, Libya and 
Iran allows these states to pursue a continuation of their 
foreign and domestic policies without the financial and 
political costs and risks involved in direct confrontations or 
in open warfare. The leaders of these states must believe 
that the sponsorship of terrorism will be beneficial, rather 
than detrimental to the interests of the state. Therefore the 
costs or risks involved in sponsoring terrorism must not be 
greater than the political goal being sought.
Syria, Libya and Iran consider sponsorship of terrorism 
as a legitimate means of achieving their goals. They chose to 
sponsor international terrorism because they believed their
xRay S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism as State- 
Sponsored Covert Warfare (Fairfax: Hero Books, 1986), 9.
2
3sponsorship would allow them to further their goals.2 
However, changes in the international arena and the reaction 
of the international community to terrorism have altered the 
costs and risks involved in sponsoring terrorism. The 
political and economic needs of states such as Syria, Libya 
and Iran, as well as the fear of military reprisals, outweigh 
the potential political gains to be achieved through the 
continuation of state sponsorship of terrorism. New economic 
and political needs have begun to dictate the need for new 
policies with respect to state sponsored terrorism.
The United States' raid on Libya, the end of the Cold 
War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli 
peace conferences contributed to increasing risks and 
diminishing returns associated with the sponsorship of 
terrorism. The costs involved in sponsoring terrorism began 
to exceed the potential gains of the policy. According to 
terrorist expert Brian Jenkins, "sanctions, the threat of 
force, and even the use of force probably has [had] a useful 
effect in at least introducing into the calculations of state 
sponsors that this activity is not entirely cost free, that 
they do run risks."3
The number of incidents of international terrorism in the 
late 1980s supports Jenkins' belief. Incidents of
international terrorism began to decline during this period.
2Shireen T. Hunter, "Terrorism: A Balance Sheet," The
Washington Quarterly 12 (Summer 1989): 21.
3Congress, House. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Anti- 
Terror ism: Hearing on the International Security Subcommittee 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 12 March 1993, 43.
4"Since 1976, the incidence of terrorism worldwide never fell 
below 400, until 1992, when the number of terrorist attacks 
worldwide was reported to be 362.f|4 There were approximately 
35% fewer incidents than the 567 incidents reported in 1991. 
States which had once pursued state sponsorship of terrorism 
began to see the need to balance the costs and gains such a 
policy could bring. Economic needs forced these states to try 
to improve their international image. Political goals forced 
these states to turn toward the diplomatic process in pursuit 
of their goals rather than a policy of sponsorship of 
terrorism.
Overall the raid on Libya, the end of the Cold War, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli peace 
conferences have affected the number of terrorist incidents 
which have occurred in the past few years. However, the 
degree to which these factors have affected individual states 
differs. An analysis of the state sponsored terrorism of 
Syria, Libya and Iran will reveal the differing degree to 
which these factors influenced the continuation of state 
sponsored terrorism. I believe the power and size of the 
individual state will determine the extent of their continued 
state sponsored terrorism. The three states to be examined in 
this analysis reveal varying degrees of political, economic 
and military power.5 The increased costs and risks and the
4Ibid., 7.
5The population, Gross National Product and total armed 
forces estimated in 1991 for each country are as follow: 
Syria, population 13 million, GNP $13 Billion, and Armed 
Forces 404,000; Libya, population 4.5 million, GNP $27
5diminishing returns associated with continued state 
sponsorship of terrorism will have more effect upon weaker 
states. These states are more susceptible to the increased 
risks. More powerful states can afford to ignore the 
increased risks and continue their state sponsorship until 
such time as the power of the state weakens and/or the costs 
become too great to ignore.
This analysis will examine how these factors have
influenced the state sponsorship of international terrorism of
Syria, Libya and Iran, as the economic and political costs of 
sponsorship began to outweigh the possible benefits of 
pursuing such a policy. Whether or not these states continue 
to sponsor international terrorism depends on their political 
needs and their political power.
First this paper will define the concept of state 
sponsored terrorism and the influences upon it in a changing 
world structure. Then it will examine the history of Syria's, 
Libya's and Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism, identifying 
the reasons for sponsoring terrorism; the organizations 
supported and the means of support; involvement in terrorist 
incidents; and any indications and/or reasons for declining 
involvement in international terrorism.
The use of terrorism to pursue political, religious and 
secular goals may offer less chance for the successful
Billion, and Armed Forces 85,000; and Iran, population 58
million, GNP $36 Billion, and Armed Forces 528,000. The point 
here is to establish the relative size of these states, with 
Iran being the largest, followed by Syria and then Libya. The 
Middle East and North Africa 1993, 39th Edition (London: 
Europa Publications, 1993), 446, 675, 839.
6achievement of Syria's, Libya's and Iran's goals and
ambitions, given the increased costs involved. The
uncertainty of the global situation and its strategic
implications may make these choices less rational than they
had previously been. However, the ultimate factor in 
determining which states may continue to sponsor terrorism may 
simply be the political power and position of the state in the 
region and in the international community.
CHAPTER ONE
THE CONCEPT OF STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM
Defining Terrorism
The term "state sponsored terrorism" remains difficult to 
define. In this paper the term will be defined as the use of 
force by private individuals sponsored by a sovereign power, 
to pursue the political goals of the sponsoring state. The 
debate over such a definition raises questions as to its 
applicability to the covert and intelligence policies of 
western states, since the definition of state sponsored 
terrorism differs according to who is defining it. Shireen T. 
Hunter writes that "States define terrorism according to their 
own viewpoint, i.e. whether or not they are victims of 
terrorism. Western powers, or first world nations are more 
likely to condemn the actions of third world countries, i.e. 
mideastern powers as terrorists, than they would be to define 
the actions of their allies as terrorist."1 Third world 
nations do not see terrorism in the same light and are more 
likely to define these actions as "paramilitary action' as 
'resistance to occupation,' or as part of a 'war of national
JHunter, 20.
7
8liberation.1,2 The leaders of Syria, Libya and Iran would not 
define their sponsorship of these groups as terrorist, but 
rather as a legitimate means to pursue political, ideological 
and religious goals.
State sponsored terrorism does differ from other types of 
force used by sovereign states. Force used by terrorists is 
not necessarily aimed at particular targets but rather at the 
destabilization of a political power or a power's influence in 
a region. Civilians, rather than military personnel or 
installations, are often the targeted victims of terrorism.
Regardless of this debate state sponsored terrorism is 
not associated with random acts of violence, but rather with 
the political goals of the sponsoring state. With the 
sponsorship of terrorist organizations, states are pursuing 
specific policy goals. "Terrorism is a political phenomenon 
aimed at achieving politically determined goals."3
The reasons for sponsoring terrorist groups depend upon 
the state, but generally they fall into at least one of the 
following categories: a political reason such as removing or
destroying the influence of another state in the region or the 
ability to covertly pursue goals; a religious reason such as 
the spread of Islam; or a secular reason such as to fulfill 
the ambitions of a ruler for Pan-Arab unity or territorial
2Rushworth M. Kidder, "Terrorism - a Term Notoriously
Difficult to Pin Down," The Christian Science Monitor. 18 
April 1986, 12.
3Hunter, 21.
9gains.4 State sponsored terrorism allows states to pursue 
these goals with relatively little risk of retaliation for 
these actions, since they can easily deny involvement.
Accordingly state sponsored terrorism as a foreign policy 
of states has continued to increase, since it has permitted 
states to pursue political objectives at a relatively low 
cost.5 As one author writes "states will continue to employ 
foreign policies of terror as long as they continue to justify 
its use and conclude that there is likely to be a favorable 
outcome."6
The means by which states employ foreign policies of 
terror differ according to the economic situation of the 
sponsoring state. State sponsorship can take the form of 
direct financial aid to terrorist organizations; training in 
weaponry, assassination methods, explosives or intelligence 
gathering; and providing transportation, intelligence and 
means of communication. Often states sponsoring terrorist 
groups use their diplomatic privileges as a means of funneling 
weapons and information to terrorists. Sponsorship can also 
vary according to the involvement of the sponsoring state in 
directing the terrorist action. Some states actually control
4Ibid., 21.
5Charles W. Kegly, Jr., T. Vance Sturgeon and Eugene R. 
Witkopf, "Structural Terrorism: The Systemic Sources of State
Sponsored Terrorism," in Terrible Beyond Endurance, ed. 
Michael Stohl and George Lopez, (New York: Greenwood Press,
1988), 13.
Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, ed., Terrible Beyond 
Endurance: The Foreign Policy of State Terrorism (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1988), 8.
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the actions of the terrorists they sponsor while others simply 
provide the terrorist organizations with the means by which to 
pursue their actions. In either case the sponsoring state is 
pursuing a policy objective in its sponsorship of terrorism.
Identifying the sponsors of terrorist organizations is 
difficult. There is little direct evidence linking states to 
terrorist groups or to specific terrorist actions. States 
which sponsor terrorist groups do so because sponsorship 
allows them to secretly pursue their political goals with 
little chance of being connected to the terrorist actions. 
Regardless of the difficulty in identifying sponsors of 
terrorism, Syria, Libya and Iran are still considered to be 
the worst offenders, and thus they remain on the United States 
Department of State list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Changes in the International Community
Though Syria, Libya and Iran are still considered to be 
the worst offenders of state terrorism, the changes in the 
makeup and balance of power in the international arena in the 
past decade have had a profound impact on the sponsorship of 
terrorism by the these states. The Cold War permitted many 
state sponsors of terrorism to balance the risks of sponsoring 
terrorism with the potential gains if terrorism had the 
desired effect. The antagonism and political uncertainty 
between the two superpowers allowed states such as Syria, 
Libya and Iran to play each superpower against the other in 
pursuing their goals. The Cold War created an atmosphere of 
uncertainty regarding how state sponsored terrorism may have
11
been viewed by the superpowers. Thus little action was taken 
against these states.
During the 1970s and 1980s the Soviet Union was 
considered a sponsor of terrorism, providing financial aid, 
training and weapons to terrorist groups. Many believed that 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries were leading 
benefactors of global terrorism.7 Syria, Libya and Iran each 
at some time received support and, in some cases, political 
and military backing from the Soviet Union.8 The United 
States, while condemning this practice, did not act against 
such a power because of the uncertainty generated by the Cold 
War atmosphere, and the lack of cooperation among the European 
powers. The United States did not want to risk antagonizing 
any of these countries and pushing them further into the 
Soviet camp. Neither power was willing to risk losing 
influence in this region by action against state sponsors of 
terrorism. Thus Syria, Libya and Iran were for many years 
able to pursue their sponsorship of terrorism without much 
cost.
However, in the early 1980s with the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan, the United States began to pursue a much more forceful 
and deterministic policy against international terrorism and 
state sponsored terrorism. Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's blatant 
support of terrorist organizations and his open hostility
7Greg Ullman, "Terrorist Threat Reduces for Now," The 
Caloarv Herald. 19 July 1992, B7.
8Cline and Alexander, Terrorism: As State Sponsored
Covert Warfare. 15.
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towards the United States made Libya an easy target of U.S. 
condemnation of state sponsored terrorism. Between 1979-1986, 
the United States and Libya confronted each other several 
times over this issue. In 1979 Libyan demonstrators sacked 
and burned the U.S. embassy in Tripoli. After this attack the 
United closed the embassy. In August 1981, the United States 
shot down two Libyan aircrafts during maneuvers in the Gulf of 
Sidra. In November 1981, President Reagan revealed a Libyan 
plot to assassinate him and several high ranking government 
officials. In December 1985, Libya was suspected of 
involvement in the massacres at the Rome and Vienna airports. 
In January 1986, the United States broke off all remaining 
economic relations with Libya and froze all Libyan assets in 
the United States. In the spring of 1986, the U.S. and Libya 
again confronted each other in the Gulf of Sidra. Libya fired 
at American planes and the U.S. retaliated by attacking the 
base and sinking three Libyan patrol boats.9
In each case the Soviet response to the confrontation was 
lukewarm in support of Libya. Libya's apparent isolation, 
internationally and in the Middle East, permitted the United 
States the flexibility it needed in confronting Libya's state 
sponsorship of terrorism. The United States' actions against 
Libya which culminated in the bombing raid in retaliation for 
Libyan involvement in a terrorist attack, stood as a warning 
to other state sponsors of terrorism. The Soviet Union's lack 
of response also provided an indication of the diminishing
Frederick Zilian, Jr., "The U.S. Raid on Libya - and 
NATO,” Orbis (Fall 1986): 501.
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political rivalry between the two superpowers and the 
possibility of cooperation between the two powers in the fight 
against terrorism.
The United States' action against Libya also contributed 
to building an international consensus for the condemnation of 
terrorism and the use of sanctions against state sponsors. 
Following the bombing raid, the European nations agreed to 
cooperate in the fight against terrorism. The cooperation of 
the international community and the lack of any retaliatory 
action in support of Libya signaled to other nations that 
state support for international terrorism would no longer be 
risk free. Economic sanctions became a means of punishing 
those states that continued to sponsor terrorist 
organizations. Accordingly in the second half of the 1980s 
the European community broke off diplomatic relations with 
Syria, Libya and Iran for their support of international 
terrorism. The United States and the international community 
began taking a much more active and forceful stand against 
sponsors of terrorism.
The thawing of relations between the superpowers and the 
ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union also influenced the 
ability of states, who formerly had depended upon the Soviet 
Union for aid, to continue to sponsor terrorism. These states 
no longer received the same amount of financial aid or 
military equipment from the Soviet Union, nor could they count 
on the backing of the Soviet Union in case of retaliatory 
measures by other states. Syria, which had long been a 
recipient of Soviet aid, saw a dramatic decrease in its
14
delivery of weapons. Between 1980 and 1984, Syria received an 
annual rate of weapons transfer of $2.9 billion, but between 
1985 and 1989 this had decreased to an average of $1.3 
billion.10 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War greatly diminished the ability and the 
inclination of the former Soviet Union to provide support to 
states sponsoring terrorism.
The prospect or hope of the success of the Arab-Israeli 
peace conferences also seemed to decrease the need to risk the 
costs involved in sponsoring terrorism. The conferences which 
began in October 1991 started a process of peace which lead to 
the historic agreement between Israel and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization in September 1993. Though the peace 
conferences are only the beginning of a long process, they do 
for the first time offer the prospect of a peaceful 
resolution. An end to the Arab-Israeli conflict which was 
acceptable to both parties could result in decreased support 
for terrorist organizations which sought the resolution of the 
Palestinian problem. States which sponsor such terrorist 
organizations may find a diplomatic resolution less costly and 
as effective. Even states which sponsor the most radical of 
the Palestinian terrorist groups, which seek the destruction 
of Israel, may accept the impracticality of such an event and 
recognize the benefits of a diplomatic resolution. Syria, in 
particular, may discontinue the support of terrorist
10Helena Cobban, The Superpowers and the Svrian-Israeli 
Conflict Bevond Crisis Management (New York: Praeger, 1991),
119.
15
organizations if a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
resolves the issue of the Golan Heights.
Though Syria, Libya and Iran continue to sponsor 
terrorist organizations, the changes in the attitude of the 
international community; and events such as the raid on Libya, 
the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the Arab-Israeli peace conferences, have influenced these 
states' desires and capability to continue such sponsorship.
CHAPTER TWO
SYRIAN TERRORISM: A TOOL FOR ASSAD’S AMBITIONS
Syria, under the leadership of Hafez Assad, has been a 
major sponsor of international terrorism. Syria’s sponsorship 
of terrorism has taken many forms, from direct involvement in 
terrorist actions to supplying arms, and a safe haven for 
known terrorists and terrorist organizations. Though the 
degree of Syrian sponsorship has varied, the reasons for 
sponsoring terrorism have always been political. Assad has 
used terrorism as an instrument of policy in order to pursue 
specific political and secular goals.1
Syrian sponsorship of international terrorism has focused 
on three main goals: first, to oppose any solution, which did
not include Syrian involvement, to the Arab-Israeli conflict; 
second, to prevent regional groupings which could threaten 
Syria’s security; and finally, to establish its position 
within the region politically and territorially.2 State 
sponsored terrorism, for Assad, has been a continuation of 
policy directed at increasing the political power of Syria and 
meeting the territorial ambitions of Assad.
hunter, 29.
2Ibid.
16
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In pursuit of these goals, Syrian terrorism has for the 
most part been focused on the Middle East, though occasionally 
Syria’s use of terrorism has extended beyond this region. 
Much of Syria’s terrorist activity has been directed against 
Israel with whom it shares a border, though it has also been 
directed at other nations, such as the United States, France 
and Great Britain, who stand in the way of Assad’s ambitions 
and political goals. Syria views Israel as an intruder in the 
region, particularly after Israel's occupation of the Golan 
Heights. Syria has used terrorism against Israeli targets in 
the hope of altering Israel’s position with regard to the 
Golan Heights.3 Syria has also pursued terrorist actions 
against Israel in order to obtain Israel’s acceptance of 
Syria’s role in Lebanon. Lebanon, which was partitioned off 
from Greater Syria in 1943, remains an area of great interest 
to Syria.4 Assad has used terrorism in Lebanon to assure that 
Syria will have a dominant role in that country and with the 
aspirations of one day again including that region in a 
Greater Syria.5
The sponsorship of terrorism permits Assad to pursue his 
ambitions and goals within the region. As a State Department 
spokesman notes " Damascus utilizes these groups to attack or 
intimidate enemies and opponents and to exert its influence in
3Alon Ben-Meir, "Hezbollah is poison pawn in Assad’s 
Lebanese Gambit,” The Toronto Star. 27 July 1993, A15.
4Rushworth M. Kidder, "State Sponsored Terrorism,” The
Christian Science Monitor. 14 May 1986, 17
5Ben-Meir, A15.
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the region. Yet at the same time, it can disavow knowledge of 
their operations.”6 The political goals and aspirations of 
President Assad are the sole motivating factors in Syria’s use 
of terrorism. State sponsored terrorism in the past has 
allowed Assad to pursue and in many ways achieve political and 
territorial goals at a negligible cost. Accordingly terrorism 
simply becomes a continuation of policy by a means which is 
cost effective.
Syrian Support of Terrorist Organizations
Syrian support of international terrorism has been 
diverse and far reaching. Syria has supported many non-Syrian 
terrorist organizations in pursuit of its political goals, but 
it has also used its own intelligence services.7 Syrian 
support of international terrorism includes support of both 
Palestinian and non-Palestinian groups. Terrorist
organizations which are known to have received Syrian support 
include the Abu Nidal Organization; Sa’iqa; Eagles of the 
Revolution; Hezbollah; the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP); and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Syria also permits the 
Revolutionary Guards of Iran access to the Bekaa Valley.8
department of State, "Syrian Support for International 
Terrorism, Department of State Bulletin. February 1987, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987),73.
7Hunter, 29.
8Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond A. Hinnebush, Syria and 
the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Council of Foreign
Relations Press, 1991), 96.
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Syria provided different levels of support and assistance to 
each of these groups, according to its political needs and 
aspirations. Accordingly Syria’s support of these terrorist 
organizations was provided only until they became a liability 
or the political cost of sponsorship exceeded the benefits 
received. Syrian sponsorship of each of these terrorist 
groups was determined by the ability of these groups to help 
meet the political goals of Assad.
Syrian support for many of these terrorist organizations 
was provided in the form of an extensive infrastructure for 
recruiting and training of terrorists. Within the Bekaa 
Valley in Lebanon, which is controlled by Syria, Syria has 
established terrorist training camps. Syria has permitted 
many of the above-named groups access to these camps. Syria 
has also provided passports, weapons, and training to members 
of these groups. Syria, with the assistance of the Soviet 
Union, has become a major source of arms for terrorists.9
Syria, unlike other states within the region, has not 
been able to provide these terrorist organizations with direct 
funding. Thus for the most part Syrian sponsorship has 
consisted of arming and training these terrorist groups. 
Syria has contributed to the support of many of these groups 
by permitting them to establish headquarters in Syria. Syrian 
intelligence has also worked closely with some of these 
organizations. "Syria has developed in the last decade or so 
perhaps the best organized and most elaborate terrorist
9Kidder, "State Sponsored Terrorism, 17.
20
apparatus in the region under the guidance of President 
Assad.”10
Syria has provided support to two of the most violent 
terrorist organizations, the Abu Nidal Organization and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. 
Syria’s association with these two organizations has been 
extensive. The Abu Nidal Organization is a * rejectionist and 
extremely violent Palestinian terrorist group,” which opposes 
all political resolutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
believes that the destruction of Israel is the only 
solution.11 The Abu Nidal Organization established its 
headquarters in Damascus in 1983. Syria provided Abu Nidal 
with logistical support and permitted it to maintain training 
camps in the Bekaa Valley. Syrian sponsorship of the Abu 
Nidal Organization has included providing the group with 
travel documents and allowing terrorists to use Syria when 
departing on missions.12
Syria permitted the Abu Nidal Organization to maintain 
their headquarters in Damascus until 1987. Until that time, 
Syrian political objectives had, to some extent, matched those 
of the Abu Nidal Organization, as both Syria and Abu Nidal 
wished to see a decrease in or destruction of Israeli power 
within the region. Syria wanted to weaken Israel in order to
10Moshe Ma’oz, "State-Run Terrorism in the Middle East: 
The Case of Syria,” Middle East Review (Spring 1987): 11.
“Department of Defense, Terrorist Group Profiles. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 5.
12Office of Public Communications, Department of State 
Bulletin. (February 1987): 74.
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increase its own power within the region and in order to 
regain lost territory. The Abu Nidal wanted to see the 
destruction of the Israeli state, in order to establish an 
independent Palestinian state. Syria supported the Abu Nidal 
Organization in order to fulfill its own political goals and 
the Abu Nidal Organization did carry out attacks that pursued 
these goals. The Abu Nidal Organization assassinated several 
Jordanian officials on behalf of Syria’s effort to abort the 
Arafat-Hussein accord over the West Bank.13 However, by 1987 
the costs of supporting Abu Nidal were far greater than the 
benefits received. As a result of Syrian connections to 
several terrorist attacks in 1985 and 1986, and Syria’s 
support of international terrorism, Syria had come under 
attack by the international community. The Abu Nidal 
Organization was linked to several of these incidents. 
Accordingly in 1987, Syria appeared to severe ties with the 
Abu Nidal Organization when it kicked the group out of 
Damascus.
Syrian sponsorship of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine-General Command was also a result of 
the similarities between the political objectives of the group 
and of Syria. The PFLP-GC also seeks the destruction of 
Israel and condemns any political resolutions to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict.14 Thus Syrian sponsorship of this group 
also permitted Syria to pursue its political goals and
13Drysdale and Hinnebush, 195.
14Department of Defense, Terrorist Group Profiles. 26.
22
aspirations in the region.
Another terrorist organization supported by Syria is the 
Sa’iqa organization. This organization was formed by the 
Baath Party in Syria in order to "manipulate the Palestinian 
liberation movement to achieve Syrian political goals.”15 
Sa’iqa seeks the elimination of Israel and the extension of 
Syrian power in the region. This terrorist organization has 
been employed directly by Syria to "attack regime opponents” 
outside of Syria.16
It is apparent by analyzing the organizations that Syria 
supported and the extent of Syrian sponsorship for these 
groups, that Syrian political goals and ambitions were the 
guiding factor in determining support. Organizations which 
presented a means of furthering Syrian political goals were 
supported, but only until such time as the costs did not 
exceed the benefits. Syria did not indiscriminately support 
any Palestinian terrorists groups, but only those which Assad 
thought could contribute to the political influence and power 
of Syria.
Syrian Involvement in Terrorist Incidents
Syria has been involved in or linked to terrorist 
incidents in both the Middle East and in Europe. Much of 
Syrian involvement in terrorist incidents has occurred in the 
Middle East and has been directed against moderate Arabs,
15Ibid. , 29.
“ibid., 30.
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Israel and anti-Syrian or independent Palestinians.17 Syria 
has often used terrorism as a means of weakening or destroying 
its enemies or anyone who stands in the way of its political 
objectives. "Damascus makes sure that terrorist operations 
serve Syrian goals - principally to maintain Assad’s dominant 
position in Lebanon and to block any progress toward an Arab- 
Israel peace agreement, which inevitably would diminish 
Syria’s importance in the region.”18 Accordingly moderate 
Arabs or Palestinian organizations, which have exhibited any 
willingness to engage in discussions with Israel regarding the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, have often been the targets of Syrian 
terrorism. Syrian sponsorship of terrorism was extensive 
following the Camp David Accords, since Syria was not a 
participant in this agreement.
Syria used terrorism to discourage or undermine any moves 
towards peace with Israel that did not include Syria as an 
active participant. In 1985, Syrian terrorism was directed 
against Jordan and its president, when Hussein tried to 
develop a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating position 
with Israel, which did not include Syria or Syrian involvement 
in the negotiations.19
Syria has also used terrorism in order to maintain its 
dominant role in Lebanon. In 1983 and 1984 terrorist actions 
supported by Syria were directed against Israeli military
17Hunter, 29.
18Russell Watson, "America’s Syrian Dilemma,” Newsweek. 
2 June 1986, 37.
l9Hunter, 29.
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targets in Southern Lebanon. 20 This terrorist policy in 
Lebanon was not directed solely at Israel. Syria also pursued 
terrorist actions directed at removing the influence of 
Western powers such as the United States and France. Syria 
was linked to the bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 
April 1983, as well as to the suicide bomb attack on the 
Marine compound in Lebanon in October 1983 .21
In the mid 1980s Syrian support of international 
terrorism was suspected in the Rome and Vienna airport 
massacres by the Abu Nidal Organization in December 1985. It 
is believed that the terrorists involved in these incidents 
came from Damascus and were trained in one of the Bekaa Valley 
training camps, which are under Syrian control.22 Syria’s 
role in the bombing of a discotheque in Germany, which killed 
a U.S. soldier, has also been suspected. It has been 
suggested that the bomb used in this incident was supplied by 
Syria.23
In April 1986, Syria was directly linked to an attempted 
bombing of an El A1 flight from London. The terrorist, when 
questioned by the British authorities, stated that the 
incident was masterminded by a colonel in Syria’s intelligence 
service. Syria was also suspected of participating in the Pan 
Am 103 bombing. The terrorist organization which is suspected
20Ma ’ oz, 12 .
21Ibid. , 12.
22Watson, 37.
23Ibid.
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of this incident, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command, has been sponsored by Syria.24
Though Syrian involvement in state sponsored 
international terrorism has been widely suspected for a long 
time, no military or political action was directed against 
Syria until 1986. In 1986, Great Britain broke off diplomatic 
relations with Syria and economic sanctions were imposed on 
Syria by Great Britain, the United States and the European 
community. Syria’s relationship with the Soviet Union also 
prevented action against Syria. The United States was not 
sure what the reaction of the Soviet Union would be, if 
military strikes were directed against Syria. Syria’s 
political influence in the region seemed an essential element 
in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, so western 
powers such as the United States did not want to antagonize 
Syria. Syria’s geographical location, influence in the region 
and relationship with the Soviet Union, permitted it to 
continue sponsoring international terrorism with little cost 
involved. Assad was able to use terrorism to pursue his 
political goals and ambitions without being overly concerned 
with the repercussions involved with such actions.
Indications of Decreased Syrian Involvement in Terrorist 
Activities
Following the allegations of Syrian involvement in the 
attempted El A1 bombing in April 1986, Syria began to pay the
24Richard Chesnoff, "Spoilers of Peace in the Middle 
East,” U.S. News & World Report. 10 July 1993, 40.
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price for its involvement in sponsoring international 
terrorism. Economic sanctions against Syria were imposed by 
the Western powers and these apparently had an effect on 
Syrian support of terrorism. However, Syria remains on the 
United States Department of State list of state sponsors of 
international terrorism. Syria is still suspected of 
supporting several groups and providing safe havens for them, 
but since 1986 the United States has found "no evidence that 
Syrian officials have been directly involved in planning or 
executing terrorist attacks outside of Lebanon.”25 However, 
the Department of State believes the following groups still 
maintain training camps in Syria or receive some support: 
Ahmad Jabril’s PFLP-GC, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad, the Abu Nidal Organization and the Japanese Red Army.26
Regardless of such continued support by Syria, the State 
Department reports that * international terrorism by 
Palestinian groups decreased from 17 incidents in 1991 to 
three incidents in 1992.” They attribute this decrease to 
restrictions placed on these groups’ activities by Syria and 
Libya. 27
President Assad has indicated that he is abandoning his 
sponsorship of terrorism. In 1987, Assad severed his 
relationship with the Abu Nidal Organization by expelling them
25Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1992. 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication, 1993),
24.
26Ibid. , 24.
27Ibid. , 13.
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from Syria. A diplomat in Damascus at that time stated, that 
the reason for this action was that " . ..Syria was cooling its 
support for terrorists ‘not for moral reasons, but because 
terror causes problems with Western states.”28 The Abu Nidal 
Organization was not the only terrorist group to lose Syrian 
support. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- 
General Command has also lost the favor of Assad, though as of 
1991 it still remained in Damascus. 29 However, without 
Syrian support, the group was experiencing financial and 
organizational difficulties. There have also been indications 
that President Assad has ordered those Palestinian extremists 
remaining in Syria to "limit their activities to supporting 
the intifada and raiding Israel from Southern Lebanon.”30
Reasons for Decreasing Syrian Support of International 
Terrorism
President Assad has presented an image of a Syrian state 
which is abandoning its past terrorist activities in favor of 
economic cooperation and diplomatic solutions to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. Syria has been willing to participate in 
the Arab-Israeli peace conferences. Perhaps a diplomatic 
peace and the economic and strategic security such a peace 
could provide has become the present rational choice for
28"EEC: A House Divided Over Hostage Issue, Middle East
Magazine. 1 May 1990, 24.
29Christopher Walker, "Collapse of Communism Leaves Middle 
East Fanatics Out in the Cold,” The Times. 5 December 1991, 8.
30Chesnoff, 41.
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President Assad. Diplomacy may now be the best way of 
achieving Syria’s political goals, given the economic and 
political power of the state.
The end of the Cold War has added to the uncertainty of 
the political situation in the Middle East. Syria, which has 
long relied upon the political and military support of the 
Soviet Union has found itself without a patron in the region. 
Syria has lost its power to exploit the superpower tension in 
this region.31 Upon coming to power, Gorbachev began to 
decrease Soviet military support to Syria.32 The Soviet 
government also indicated that it would not support Syria’s 
bid for strategic parity with Israel and began to improve its 
own relations with Israel. These steps decreased the 
political and strategic importance of Syria for the Soviet 
Union in the region.33 The decreased Soviet military support 
weakened the position of Syria in relation to Israel and 
within the region in general. This weakening of Syria's power 
made it more susceptible to the risks and costs associated 
with the sponsorship of terrorism.
The transformation of the international arena has 
required a change in the implementation of Syria’s political 
goals and ambitions. Diplomacy and political resolutions to 
the relations between Syria and Israel have replaced military 
or terrorist options, or perhaps as Alasdair Drysdale points
31Drysdale, 7.
32Cobban, xxi.
33Drysdale and Hinnebush, 8.
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out "Syria had never abandoned the ultimate aim of attaining 
a political settlement.” Rather the reason for Assad's policy 
was "to position Syria to rejoin a serious peace process, if 
one seemed to be in the cards and Arab solidarity could be 
reconstructed.”34 Perhaps the political power of Syria in the 
region now requires abandoning the sponsorship of terrorism. 
Without the patronage of a superpower or the cooperation of 
other states in the region, Syria in its present economic 
state can no longer afford to continue to sponsor terrorism. 
The interests of the state and its overall political position 
require the end of state sponsored terrorism.
^Drysdale and Hinnebush, 143.
CHAPTER THREE 
LIBYAN TERRORISM: QADDAFI’S IDEOLOGICAL WARFARE
Muammar Qaddafi, the leader of Libya, sponsors terrorist 
organizations in order to fulfill political and ideological 
goals. Terrorism under Qaddafi’s sponsorship became a means 
of reacting against Libya’s enemies. Qaddafi "has employed 
terrorism in order to lash out against regime opponents and to 
further his own foreign policy objectives within the Arab 
political arena and within worldwide revolutionary movements. ” 1 
Qaddafi has used terrorism against Libyan dissidents abroad 
and against Israelis, Americans and Europeans. Qaddafi’s 
sponsorship of terrorism permitted him to indirectly react 
against his enemies without fearing the repercussions of his 
actions. Qaddafi’s ultimate goals in sponsoring terrorism 
have been the achievement of Arab unity, the spread of Arab- 
Muslim influence and the promotion of Qaddafi’s own form of 
socialism.2 Qaddafi believes that Arab unity and a resolution 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict can only be achieved with the 
elimination of the state of Israel through the use of force. 
Terrorism became Qaddafi’s means of using force to attempt to
department of Defense, Terrorist Group Profiles. 1.
2Hunter, 23.
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destroy or weaken the state of Israel and to combat his 
enemies abroad. The western nations of the world in 
particular the United States were also targets of Libyan 
sponsored terrorism because of their capitalist systems, their 
relationship with Israel and their involvement in the Middle 
East. Qaddafi believed that terrorism was a legitimate means 
of combating Israel’s power and western states’ influence in 
the Middle East and thus ultimately a policy which would lead 
to Arab unity.
Qaddafi believed that sponsoring terrorism was a rational 
political choice for achieving these goals. Terrorism would 
weaken or destroy his opponents thus allowing him to achieve 
his goal at a negligible cost. Libya did not have the 
military capabilities for challenging its enemies in 
legitimate warfare. Qaddafi used terrorism as part of Libya's 
foreign policy. The Cold War and the disunity of the Arab 
world over the issue of Israel and a resolution to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict permitted Qaddafi to pursue such a policy 
indirectly without fear of military reprisals.
Libyan support for terrorist organizations
Libya’s sponsorship of international terrorism has been 
extensive and ideologically driven. Unlike other state 
sponsors, Libya has supported a very diverse group of 
organizations and not simply those groups that might 
contribute to its political goals. As one author has stated 
"Libya’s contribution to the overall infrastructure of 
international terrorism was greater than that of Syria and
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Iran and possibly of any other country. The Qaddafi regime 
was the closest thing in existence to a missionary society for 
world terrorism.”3 In particular Qaddafi has supported any 
group claiming to be anti-Israeli or anti-American.4 Qaddafi 
has sponsored terrorist groups such as the Islamic Jihad, 
Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the 
Abu Nidal Organization, the Red Brigades, and the Irish 
Republican Army. The goals of some of these organizations do 
not necessarily correspond to those of Qaddafi, other than to 
wreak havoc on western regimes or threaten the stability of 
regimes. Qaddafi was willing to support most terrorist 
organizations which he believed were fighting for the same 
ideological beliefs as he was.
Libya has sponsored international terrorism in many 
different ways. Qaddafi has provided direct financial aid to 
many groups. He has also established camps in Libya for 
training terrorist groups. It is believed that at one time 
twenty such camps were in existence in Libya. Qaddafi has 
also provided safe havens for known terrorists, including Abu 
Nidal; the terrorists involved in the attack at the Munich 
Olympics and currently the two terrorists wanted in connection 
with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Libya has also 
provided terrorist organizations with passports, diplomatic 
privileges and arms.
3Brian L. Davis, Qaddafi. Terrorism and the Origins of 
the U.S. Attack on Libva (New York: Praeger, 199 0), 71.
4Cline and Alexander, Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert 
Warfare, 17.
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Libyan Involvement in Terrorist Incidents
Libya has been linked to many terrorist groups and 
terrorist incidents in the Middle East and in Europe between 
1970 to 1986. Libya’s involvement in international terrorism 
began almost immediately upon Qaddafi’s taking power. 
International terrorism became a tool of Qaddafi’s foreign 
policy.
During the 1980s Libyan links to international terrorism 
were widely recognized. In the early 1980s Libyan terrorism 
was directed at Libyan dissidents. Several Libyan dissidents, 
living in Europe, were assassinated. Attempts were also made 
to assassinate Libyan dissidents within the United States.5 
Libya was also linked to plots to assassinate Egyptian 
President Mubarak, former Sudanese President Nimeiri, Chadian 
President Habre and Zaire’s President Mobutu.6 The Reagan 
administration, upon coming to office, condemned Libya for its 
support of international terrorism. Libya continued to 
sponsor international terrorism in the Middle East and in 
Europe and insurgent movements in Africa.
Throughout the early 1980s relations between the United 
States and Libya continued to deteriorate over the issue of 
terrorism. These problems were intensified by confrontations 
between U.S. and Libyan forces in the Gulf of Sidra. 
However, international condemnation against Libya’s 
sponsorship of terrorism began to occur in the mid 1980s,
5Warren Richey, "Libya’s Heavy Hand in International 
Terror,” The Christian Science Monitor. 18 April 1986, 3.
6Ibid.
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following several terrorist incidents involving Libya. In 
1984 a British policewoman was shot and killed as personnel in 
the Libyan embassy shot at Libyan dissidents outside of the 
embassy. In May 1984 a Libyan assassination plot against 
President Reagan and other top ranking U.S. officials was 
uncovered.7
Libyan involvement in international terrorism reached a 
peak in 1985. In 1985 and 1986, there was a rash of terrorist 
attacks in Europe and Libya was believed to have been involved 
in several of these incidents. In December 1985 terrorists 
simultaneously attacked the Rome and Vienna airports killing 
several people. The United States accused Libya of 
involvement in this attack. Though Qaddafi denied any 
involvement in this incident, he professed his support for 
such actions and his willingness to continue to use such 
measures. Following the terrorist attack at the Rome and 
Vienna airports the United States imposed economic sanctions 
against Libya. Throughout the early part of 198 6 Qaddafi 
continued to advocate the use of international terrorism, 
while the United States sought European cooperation in its 
fight against Libya. In April 1986 the bombing of a 
discotheque, frequented by U.S. soldiers, resulted in the 
death of two people, including a U.S. soldier. Libya was 
linked to this bombing. In retaliation for this incident the 
United States bombed Libya. On April 14, 1986 American forces 
unilaterally conducted an air attack on targets that were
7Ibid.
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considered part of Qaddafi's terrorist infrastructure in 
Tripoli and Benghazi.
Following the raid on Libya by the United States, Libya’s 
involvement in international terrorism decreased. However, 
Qaddafi continued to express his support of international 
terrorism. At this time he is providing sanctuary to the two 
Libyan agents suspected in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 
and has refused to hand them over to U.S. or British 
officials.
Indications of Decreased Libyan Involvement in Terrorist 
Activities
Following the bombing of Libya in 198 6, Libyan 
involvement in international terrorism did decline through 
1987. Qaddafi, however, has not given any indications that he 
has completely abandoned his support for terrorist 
organizations. Libya still attempts to kill dissidents who 
are living abroad.8 Libya also continues to host several of 
the most extreme Palestinian terrorist organizations. Qaddafi 
permitted the Abu Nidal Organization to establish its 
headquarters in Libya, after it was expelled from Syria. 
Libya remains on the United States Department of State list of 
those states which continue to support international 
terrorism.
Though Qaddafi continues to stress his support of 
international terrorism, there have also been some indications
department of Defense, Terrorist Group Profiles. 3.
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that he has closed some well-known terrorist training camps in 
Libya.9 Qaddafi, at one point, even expressed a willingness 
to hand over the suspected Pan Am bombers. Though Qaddafi 
continues to advocate the use of terrorism, he has been less 
vocal about his support for terrorist organizations. Libya 
has also not been linked to any recent terrorist incidents. 
Libya remains hostile towards the United States and western 
powers, but there have not been any indications of Qaddafi 
using terrorism against these powers.
Reasons for Decreasing Libyan Support of International 
Terrorism
The United States’ airstrike on Libya revealed the 
consequences of continued support of international terrorism. 
Qaddafi can no longer afford to ignore the possible 
consequences of his support for terrorist organizations. The 
repercussions of such support may now exceed the benefits that 
Qaddafi hoped to receive. Relations between Libya and the 
international community remain hostile. In April 1992, the 
United Nations imposed sanctions against Libya, as a result of 
its refusal to hand over the suspected Pan Am bombers. These 
economic sanctions, as well as the political isolation of 
Libya in the Middle East and in the international community, 
have forced Qaddafi to reconsider his sponsorship of 
terrorism. The economic and political consequences of 
Qaddafi’s sponsorship of terrorism have left Libya with a
9Peter Ross Range, "The Unmasking of Assad,” U.S. News & 
World Report. 10 November 1986, 31.
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weakened economy and a state which is politically isolated. 
The economic hardships which have occurred as a result of the 
sanctions have also led to some political unrest. Libya’s 
economy which is dependent upon the exports of crude 
petroleum, has been weakened by the sanctions and embargoes 
imposed by the United Nations. The sanctions and the 
political uncertainty have further hindered the economy by 
discouraging foreign investors.10 Libyan officials reported 
in November 1992 that the economic sanctions have cost the 
Libyan economy some U.S. $2,500M.n
The economic situation in Libya required the improvement 
of economic relations with the western world and the removal 
of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations. The end of 
the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
uncertainty of the political situation in the Middle East also 
required the establishment of better political relations with 
the international community.
Though Qaddafi may continue to express his willingness to 
sponsor international terrorism, the economic and political 
reality of such support makes his continued sponsorship 
unlikely. State sponsorship of terrorism by Libya is no 
longer a rational political choice. Qaddafi's involvement in 
terrorism will no longer allow him to achieve his goals. The 
economic and political situation in Libya has made the costs 
and risks of sponsoring terrorism far greater than the
10The Europa World Yearbook. 1993 ed., s.v. "Libya.” 
"Ibid.
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benefits received. Libya's political power has been weakened 
and Libya is no longer in a position to ignore the 
international community's condemnation of its sponsorship of 
terrorism. The U.S. raid on Libya forced Qaddafi to realize 
the repercussions of his terrorist policy.
CHAPTER FOUR
IRANIAN TERRORISM: ISLAMIC TERRORISM OR FOREIGN POLICY
The Republic of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism differs 
in many ways from that of Syria and Libya. Iranian terrorism 
has been pursued in order to achieve, for the most part 
religious goals, though political goals have also been 
pursued. Iran seeks to spread revolutionary Islam. Terrorism 
is used as an effort "to unify the Muslims and other so-called 
oppressed of the world, ... and to eliminate the influence of 
the great powers from the Muslim world.”1
Iran’s support of terrorism, though it sometimes seeks 
both political and religious goals, is an element of the 
Islamic faith. Some scholars believe that Iran’s sponsorship 
of terrorism should be defined differently from that of other 
state sponsors. The author of Holv Terror identifies Iran’s 
terrorism as " Islamic terrorism”. Islamic terrorism is 
considered "as an expression of Islamic revival - which must, 
by definition, lead to the conquest of the entire globe by the 
True Faith - it bases all its actions on the dictum that the 
end justifies the means. Recourse to terrorism, therefore, is 
one means among many that the fundamentalist movement uses and
JHunter, 23.
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will continue to use in its campaign to create a universal 
Islamic state and to spread the rule of Islam throughout the 
world.”2 Terrorism is used as a tool for spreading Islam and 
for destroying and weakening the effect of Western capitalist 
influences on the Arab world. Since the Khomeini regime came 
to power, the government of Iran has sponsored terrorism as 
part of its foreign policy in order to pursue this goal.
Though religious beliefs remain the main determinant of 
Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, political decisions have also 
influenced the use of terrorism. In its war with Iraq, Iran 
did use terrorism in order to assure the support of 
neighboring states. Terrorism has also been implemented 
against western powers, in particular the United States, in 
attempts to weaken and ultimately to remove U.S. influence in 
the Middle East region.
Iran’s sponsorship of international terrorism seems to be 
a less rational political choice by its leaders, since the 
emotional influence of its religion greatly contributes to its 
implementation. The Islamic component of Iranian sponsorship 
of terrorism allows the government the ability to distance 
itself from the Islamic "fanatics,” while still benefiting 
politically from the results and experiencing little fear of 
the repercussions. In many ways Iran’s sponsorship of 
terrorism can be defined as an Islamic terrorism even though 
the results of this terrorism do have political repercussions.
2Amir Taheri, Holv Terror: Inside the World of Islamic
Terrorism (Maryland: Adler and Adler, 1987), 15.
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Iranian Support of Terrorist Organizations
Iranian sponsorship of terrorism has ranged from direct 
government involvement to supporting individual terrorist 
organizations. The Iranian government, under Khomeini, helped 
organize, plan and implement terrorist plots in the Middle 
East and internationally."3 Islamic Revolutionary Iran 
entered the 1980s with two aspects of its foreign policy 
clearly defined. It intended to encourage the Islamic
revolution elsewhere and it was quite prepared to ignore the 
conventional niceties of diplomatic convention to achieve its 
policy goals.**4
Within Iran the Islamic Revolutionary Council was set up 
in 1981 to spread the Islamic influences of the Iranian
revolutionaries.5 The Islamic Revolutionary Council was
responsible for overseeing several terrorist organizations 
such as A1 Dawa, the Call; Amal Islami, Hope; and Hezbollah, 
Party of God.6 Hezbollah, which operates from Lebanon, has
been strongly supported by the Iranian government, and it is 
considered to be Iran’s most dangerous terrorist group. The 
Hezbollah was created by Iran, and sections of the 
organization are directly linked to the Iranian Revolutionary
3Cline and Alexander, Terrorism as State Sponsored Covert 
Warfare, 15.
4Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Vavesteh, ed. Iran 
and the International Community (London: Routledge, 1991), 83.
5Ibid., 16.
6Ibid., 16.
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Guards.7 Hezbollah, and its military arm, the Islamic Jihad, 
seek to spread Islam by undermining Arab regimes which do not 
follow the dictates of Islam and are being influenced by 
Western influences in the Middle East. Hezbollah also seeks 
to establish a Shi'a Islamic state in Lebanon.8 It opposes 
the peace talks and works to undermine this process. 
Hezbollah espouses an intense hatred of any influences that do 
not support its views of Shi’a Muslim ideology. Hezbollah is 
headquartered in West Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley. 
Hezbollah is very closely linked to the Iranian government 
which provides the group with training, weapons and 
communication facilities.9 The group trains in the Bekaa 
Valley in close association with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. 
It is believed that Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards 
work together in many terrorist attacks.10
Iran also supports terrorism as a center for training, 
financing and indoctrinating potential terrorists.11 Iran 
remains the principal sponsor of extremist Islamic and 
Palestinian groups. It continues to provide funding, training 
and weapons to terrorist groups that seek the same religious 
and political goals; the spread of Islam; the destruction of
department of Defense, Terrorist Group Profiles. 16.
8Ibid., 15.
9Ehteshami and Vavasteh, 38.
10Department of Defense, Terrorist Group Profiles. 15.
nHunter, 25.
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Western influences in the region and the collapse of the peace 
process.
Iranian Involvement in Terrorist Incidents
Iran has been associated with acts of terrorism since 
Khomeini’s rise to power in 1979. "The Iranian regime has 
practiced state terrorism since it took power in 1979; it is 
currently the deadliest state sponsor and has achieved 
worldwide reach.”12 Terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran have 
occurred in the Middle East and in Europe. Terrorist actions 
sponsored by Iran have ranged from kidnappings, 
assassinations; attacks against Arab and Islamic threats; 
attacks on peacekeeping forces; airline hijackings and 
bombings in Europe.
In the early 1980s kidnappings of western citizens by 
Iranian backed groups such as Hezbollah or the Islamic Jihad 
occurred frequently in Lebanon and Iran. In 198 3 bombing 
attacks in Beirut were conducted by Iranian sponsored groups 
such as Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. The United States and 
France, in particular, were the victims of several such 
attacks. In April 1983 a suicide car bomb attack on the U.S. 
Embassy in Beirut resulted in the death of 49 people. The 
Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for this attack. In 
October 1983 "kamikazi” terrorists drove trucks carrying 
explosives into the U.S. Marine and French military barracks 
in Beirut, killing 241 U.S. soldiers and 56 French soldiers.
12Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 
1992, 1.
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The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for this attack. In 
November and December 1983 car bomb attacks were directed 
against the Israeli headquarters in Tyre in Southern Lebanon 
and against U.S. and French embassies in Beirut. Shi’a 
militias received moral support and probably financial and 
military assistance as well from the co-religionists in Iran 
for many of these attacks. In the international community it 
was believed that the Shi’a militias involved in these attacks 
were terrorists directed from Tehran.13
Throughout 1984 and 1985 the kidnappings and murders of 
foreign diplomats and citizens continued to occur in Beirut. 
Responsibility for many of these actions were claimed by the 
Islamic Jihad. From late 1984 on, several hijackings by 
Hezbollah also occurred. In December 1984 Kuwait Air flight 
221 to Tehran was hijacked, and 2 U.S. Agency for 
International Development officials were killed. In June 1985 
TWA flight 847 was hijacked by the Hezbollah, a U.S. Navy 
diver was murdered and 39 U.S. citizens were held hostage for 
17 days before their release was negotiated.
Iran was also linked to the assassination of several 
Iranian dissidents in the 1980s. Iranian involvement was also 
linked to several bombing campaigns which occurred in Paris in 
1985 and 1986. It is believed that these attacks were 
directed against France because of its support of Iraq in the 
war between Iran and Iraq.14
13Ehteshami and Vavasteh, 38.
14Department of Defense, Terrorist Group Profiles. 3.
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More recently Iran has been linked to the 1992 bombing of 
the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. The Islamic Jihad 
claimed responsibility for this attack and there is mounting 
evidence of direct government involvement in this terrorist 
act.15 In 1992 Iranian sponsored terrorism has been linked to 
over 20 terrorist attacks; mainly against Iranian dissidents 
and Israeli interests.16 In 1992 Iran also hosted a series of 
high profile meetings with Hezbollah and Hamas in the hopes of 
destroying the prospects of the Arab- Israeli peace process. 
Iran’s role in the 1993 World Trade bombing has also been 
questioned. Iran continues "to be the most active of the 
state sponsors” of international terrorism.
Indications of Decreased Iranian Involvement in Terrorist 
Activities
There are very few indications of decreased Iranian 
involvement in terrorist activities. Iran remains on the U.S.
Department of State List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
However, unlike Syria and Libya, no evidence of direct links 
between the terrorists and the government have been proven. 
The Iranian government, however, is strongly suspected of 
supporting and perhaps organizing many of the terrorist
attacks of the Islamic terrorists such as Hezbollah and
Islamic Jihad. Regardless of the ability of Western powers 
to provide evidence of direct involvement of the Iranian
l5Department of Defense, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 
1992, 1.
16Ibid.
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government, Iran has been forced to pay the consequences of 
its sponsorship of terrorism. Iran’s relationship with the 
Western powers dramatically deteriorated with the Iranian 
Revolution, and the Iranian economy has suffered as a result.
It is believed that Iran continues to sponsor terrorism. 
It continues to provide funding, training in the Bekaa Valley 
and safe havens for terrorist organizations. However, at the 
same time, Iran has tried to distance itself from these 
terrorist organizations by working to resolve or aid in the 
resolution of the hostage situation in the Middle East.
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union has permitted Iran to pursue a new foreign policy. It 
has sought to improve relations with the United States, the 
Soviet Union and Western European governments. Iran has tried 
to improve its relations with the international community by 
participating in the negotiations for the release of western 
hostages being held in the Middle East. The United States 
and the Soviet Union have been somewhat receptive to these 
rapprochements in order to fulfill their own political or 
economic goals. In the mid 1980s the United States pursued a 
public policy of opposition to Iran and a clandestine policy 
of exchanging arms for hostages, in the hopes of securing the 
release of the remaining American hostages in the Middle East. 
This contradictory policy weakened the position of the United 
States in the eyes of the international community, the 
government of Iran and of the terrorists themselves.17 The
17Ehteshami and Vavasteh, 39.
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Soviet Union also sought closer economic and political ties 
with Iran after the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and 
Iran were both interested in establishing economic ties which 
would benefit both countries.
Iran was successful in re-establishing relations with the 
western powers. However, in 1989, relations between Iran and 
the western community broke down over the Rushdie affair.18 
Diplomatic contacts between European Community members and 
Iran were suspended.19 However, by 1990 diplomatic relations 
were restored.
Iran has been trying to improve its image in the hopes of 
soliciting foreign investments and economic ties with the 
Western economy. As one author writes "Iran’s inflation in 
1991 was about 50 percent and unemployment stood at 3 0 
percent; its per capital national income was half of what it 
had been before the revolution.”20 The economic and military 
situation in Iran requires improved relations with the 
international community. The political situation in the 
Middle East also remains unclear. Iran still views Iraq as a 
threat and therefore Iran was willing to support the American
180n February 14, 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini issued a
religious edict, pronouncing a death sentence on the British 
author Salman Rushdie because of his book Satanic Verses. In 
1992 the death sentence was upheld by both the Iranian 
parliament and Iran's Chief Justice. Department of Defense, 
Patterns of Global Terrorism 1992. 22.
19The Eurooa World Yearbook. 1993 ed,. s.v. "Iran.”
20Amin Saikal, "The West and Post-Khomeini Iran,” The 
World Today. (October 1993): 199.
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led Arab coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War.21 With the 
end of the Gulf War and the retention of power by Saddam 
Hussein, the government of Iran accepts the necessity of 
trying to improve or maintain relations with the West and the 
Soviet Union. They realize their need to improve their 
diplomatic and economic power position in the region. 
However " Iran, while desperately courting Western investment 
and assistance to bail out its failed Islamic economic 
experiment, remains nonetheless rhetorically and to some 
extent genuinely hostile to the West, the United States in 
particular. ”22
Iran’s continued support of terrorism does present a 
barrier to the improvement of relations with the international 
community. However, the connection between the Islamic 
fundamentalists and the terrorist organizations does provide 
a means for the government to deny its involvement. Though 
the Iranian government does support these fundamentalist 
tendencies, it will overlook them to some extent in order to 
pursue Iran’s military and economic interests.23 "While 
committed to a theocratic form of government, they recognize 
that the costs of channeling their revolutionary fervor abroad 
have made it difficult to pursue Iran’s security interests.”24
21Leon T. Hadar, "What Green Peril?,” Foreign Affairs. 
(Spring 1993): 33.
22Judith Miller, "The Challenge of Radial Islam,” Foreign 
Affairs, (Spring 1993): 49.
23Hadar, 34.
24Ibid.
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Accordingly Iran has sought two different foreign policies, an 
open policy which seeks to improve its image and standing in 
the international community and a covert policy which can be 
easily denied as the workings of Islamic terrorists, which 
seeks to extend the spread of Islam and the destruction of 
other influences within the region.
The pursuit of such contradictory policies is a rational 
choice by the Iranian government. This choice enables Iran to 
present an image of a government which is moving towards 
cooperation with the international community while it 
continues to support Islamic terrorists. Even if the costs of 
such a covert policy begin to be detrimental to the economic, 
political and military standing of Iran within the region and 
within the international community, the religious element of 
Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism may influence the continued 
sponsorship of terrorism. Iran, unlike Syria and Libya, is 
not simply seeking political or ideological goals, so Iran’s 
choice in continuing to sponsor terrorism may be an irrational 
political choice.
Iran's political and military power in the region permits 
it to continue to pursue a dual policy of seeking improved 
relations with the international community, while continuing 
to sponsor terrorism. However, Iran's economic problems may 
compel it to abandon such a policy. If Iran's economic power 
continues to decrease and the internal political struggles 
continue to increase, Iran may be forced to re-examine its
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terrorist policy.25 In the future, state sponsored terrorism 
by Iran may be abandoned, in order to maintain Iran's economic 
and political position in the Middle East.
25Elaine Sciolino, "Iran's Difficulties Lead Some in U.S. 
to Doubt Threat," New York Times. 5 July 1994, Al.
CONCLUSION
Though state sponsored terrorism increased dramatically 
in the 1970s and 1980s, it declined in the period from 1987 to 
1992.1 The changes in the structure of the international 
community are an essential element for explaining the 
decreasing support of states for international terrorism. The 
raid on Libya, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli peace conferences, as well 
as the ensuing cooperation between these nations and the 
European community have increased the risks and costs 
associated with state sponsorship of international terrorism. 
As a result states such as Syria, Libya and Iran have been 
forced to reexamine the benefits and ramifications of 
continued state sponsorship.
The end of the Cold War began a slow process of 
decreasing state sponsorship of terrorism. As relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union began to thaw, 
Soviet military support to Syria and Libya began to decrease. 
Syria and Libya began to feel more isolated in the Middle East 
and less able to depend upon the backing of the Soviet Union. 
Iran, which had long depended upon the antagonism between the
department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 
1992, 57.
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two superpowers in order to maintain financial and military 
aid, also began to lose its ability to exploit the two 
superpowers* As a result these nations were less able to 
ignore the condemnation of the United States, the Soviet Union 
and the European community with respect to state sponsorship 
of terrorism. The political structure of the international 
community had been completely altered and these changes 
greatly affected the ability of Syria, Libya and Iran to 
continue sponsoring international terrorism.
Syria, Libya and Iran began to examine the need to 
improve their international image and their relations with the 
international community. These states soon found themselves 
the objects of economic sanctions. Their diplomatic relations 
with the international community also suffered. For Syria and 
Libya, the costs of sponsoring terrorism began to exceed the 
benefits gained. Iran, however, was in a better political 
position to ignore the costs involved and thus continue to 
sponsor terrorism. Regardless of Iran's ability to disregard 
the costs involved, Shireen T. Hunter notes "states engaged in 
sponsoring terrorism and the perpetrators of terrorist acts 
have suffered more than have the victims in terms of national 
and human losses, as well as in terms of power and prestige."2
The economic ramifications of continued sponsorship began 
to outweigh the expected benefits. The economic sanctions 
imposed upon these states by the international community began 
to wreak havoc on their domestic economies. The weakness of
2Hunter, 18.
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the domestic economies also posed problems for the political 
stability of the states, as political unrest and dissension 
occurred as a result of the economic hardships. The economic 
situation forced these states to seek much needed foreign 
investments and economic aid.
Syria and Libya, in particular, have attempted to 
distance themselves from their previous levels of support for 
terrorist organizations in the hopes of attracting foreign 
investment. Iran has likewise sought to attract foreign 
investments and improve its relations with the international 
community. However, Iran has not severed its relationship 
with terrorist organizations. The leaders of Syria and Libya 
.distanced themselves from state sponsorship by such means as 
closing training camps, severing ties with known terrorists 
organizations, and by being less outspoken about supporting 
terrorist movements. Iran, however, continues to be linked to 
several radical Islamic movements which use terrorist methods 
to achieve their goals.
The costs of sponsoring terrorism have not been solely 
economic. There have also been military and political costs. 
The end of the Cold War has resulted in decreases in the 
amount of military aid provided to Syria and Libya, in 
particular from the Soviet Union. The amount of military aid 
provided to Syria by the Soviet Union decreased dramatically 
as a result of the thawing of superpower relations. Libya 
found itself isolated in the region as the Soviet Union began 
to withdraw its support. The decreases in military aid and 
the withdrawal of military support have made Syria and Libya
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more vulnerable to the repercussions of continued state 
sponsorship of terrorism.
The end of the Cold War also contributed to security 
problems for Syria, Libya and Iran. The Middle East is no 
longer divided into American and Soviet spheres of influence, 
and the new political uncertainty in the region affects the 
security of these states. The Iran-Iraq war revealed two 
potential powers capable of dominating the region. 
Accordingly it is essential that states such as Syria, Libya 
and Iran maintain friendly relations with the United States, 
the Soviet Union and the European community in case of 
aggression by another state in the region. The Persian Gulf 
War intensified the need of these states to maintain such 
relations. Iraq exhibited the intention and capabilities to 
dominate the Gulf region. The continued sponsorship of 
terrorism may hinder theses states from receiving such 
military support and thus threaten their security. 
Accordingly Syria and Libya will probably continue to distance 
themselves from sponsoring terrorism. Iran, however, has been 
able to continue her military buildup unhindered. Recent 
indications, however, have revealed that economic problems 
have started to slow down this process.3
The United States' unilateral raid on Libya in 
retaliation for its involvement in a terrorist attack stands 
as a warning of other security problems for states involved in 
or contemplating similar sponsorship of terrorism. The raid
3Sciolino, Al
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did seem to have the desired effect on Libya. Libya's 
subsequent involvement in terrorism decreased. The raid also 
revealed to Syria and Iran the possible consequences of state 
sponsored terrorism particularly because the raid catalyzed 
greater cooperation between the United States and the European 
community in dealing with terrorism. The raid on Libya 
revealed the potential isolation state sponsors of terrorism 
could expect if they continued to pursue such policies. 
Sponsoring terrorism was no longer risk free. Economic, 
military and political retaliations are possible consequences 
for supporting terrorist attacks.
The fear of reprisals, both military and economic, had an 
effect on Syrian and Libyan sponsorship of terrorism. In the 
years following the United States' attack, there was a 
downward trend in the number of terrorist incidents. Syria 
and Libya both tried to distance themselves from the 
sponsorship of terrorism. Syria severed its relationship with 
the Abu Nidal Organization and began to distance itself from 
the PFLC-GC. Libya also took steps to appear less closely 
connected to sponsoring terrorism, by closing training camps. 
In the past several years Syria and Libya have not been 
directly linked to any terrorist attacks, though they have 
both been suspected of being involved in the bombing of Pan Am 
Flight 103.
The political and economic costs of state sponsored 
terrorism have not been as great for Iran, because of Iran's 
power in the region. Iran continues to sponsor terrorism. It 
has been linked to the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in
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Buenos Aires and is suspected of being involved in the bombing 
of the World Trade Center.
The Arab-Israeli peace conferences have for the first 
time offered the prospect of a diplomatic or peaceful 
resolution to many of the political and secular goals of the 
states sponsoring terrorism. The possibility of a diplomatic 
solution to many of the issues has helped negate the need to 
resort to terrorism, particularly since the level of risk 
involved has risen considerably. A peaceful solution to the 
conflict could resolve many of Syria's reasons for sponsoring 
terrorism. As part of the peace process, Syria hopes to 
regain the Golan Heights, a goal it has long sought. With the 
end of the Cold War and decreased Soviet military aid, this 
goal had become less achievable. The decrease in Soviet aid 
crushed Syria's hopes of achieving military parity with Israel 
and therefore greatly diminished Syria's hopes for regaining 
the Golan Heights in a military maneuver, or through terrorist 
attacks on Israeli targets. The Arab-Israeli peace
conferences, however, still offer an opportunity to achieve 
this goal. The conferences provide Syria, with a means of 
achieving political and territorial goals without the risks 
involved in trying to achieve them through terrorism. The 
peace conferences will not affect Libyan and Iranian support 
for terrorism. The Arab unity sought by Qaddafi will not be 
resolved, nor will the spread of Islam sought by Iran. 
Nevertheless these conferences and the hope of a peaceful 
resolution should contribute to the general decrease in state 
sponsored terrorism, since an acceptable resolution to the
57
Arab-Israeli conflict could decrease the amount of support 
available to many of the Palestinian terrorist groups.
The United States' raid on Libya, the end of the Cold 
War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli 
peace conferences have all contributed to a decrease in state 
sponsored terrorism. These four events have forced Syria, 
Libya and Iran to reexamine their sponsorship of terrorism and 
the economic and political costs of such sponsorship. The 
cost of state sponsorship of terrorism for Syria and Libya now 
exceeds the returns. The realization of the diminishing 
returns of state sponsorship have become more apparent as a 
result of the raid on Libya, the end of the Cold War, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli peace 
conferences. These events have altered the costs and risks 
involved in sponsoring terrorism, and made the choice of 
sponsoring terrorism appear less rational.
Accordingly state sponsored terrorism by Syria and Libya 
should continue to decline. The economic, political and 
security needs of these states should force them to abandon 
terrorism as a foreign policy option. The changes in the 
structure of the international community have altered the 
risks and costs of state sponsored terrorism and have almost 
destroyed the possible gains that such support sought. The 
sponsorship of terrorism is no longer the optimal way to 
achieve their goals and the costs of such sponsorship have 
become far too great.
The question of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism remains 
unresolved. Iran continues to pursue a dual policy of
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rapprochement with Western powers while continuing to use 
terrorism as a policy option. However, economic difficulties 
and internal political unrest could affect this decision. If 
the political power of Iran continues to decrease so could its 
sponsorship of terrorism. A decrease in the political power 
of Iran could increase the costs and risk of state sponsored 
terrorism.
This analysis of the state sponsored terrorism of Syria, 
Libya and Iran has revealed varying degrees of commitment to 
state sponsored terrorism, in relation to the political power 
of the states. The hypothesis that the political power of a 
state helps determine its willingness to sponsor terrorism 
fits the cases of Syria, Libya and Iran. The weaker states, 
Syria and Libya, were more sensitive to the factors 
influencing state sponsorship of terrorism. The costs and 
risks involved in sponsoring terrorism were too great for 
these states and thus they began to decrease their sponsorship 
of terrorism. Iran, the most powerful of the three states, 
was less susceptible to these factors. Accordingly Iran 
continues to sponsor terrorism. The variance among the three 
states' decreasing use of terrorism does seem to correlate 
with the political power of the states.
Though this hypothesis was only examined in relation to 
a small number of cases, it could be used to predict future 
patterns of state sponsored terrorism in the Mideast and in 
the international community. This hypothesis could provide a 
means for examining other states' potential for sponsoring 
terrorism.
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